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TRESPASS IN SECONDARY RECOVERY
Oliver Kelley
When pressure in an oil reservoir falls below that needed to yield
oil in paying quantities, often it is feasible to employ secondary
recovery measures' to obtain additional production. The principal
method is repressuring by water flooding,2 in which water is forced
into the oil bearing stratum through input wells and spreads radially
from the well bottom pushing the "dead oil" ahead of it toward
producing wells.' If an input well is located near a lease boundary,
the injecting party may benefit the adjoining leaseholder by driving
dead oil across the boundary. When this occurs, the injecting party
is deemed voluntarily to have conferred a benefit upon the adjoining
leaseholder,' and the latter is permitted to produce, if he can, the
migrating oil under the rule of capture.' At the same time, the
injected water, being no respecter of lease lines, may cross the bound-
ary.
What are the legal consequences when this occurs? Technically,
the injecting party is guilty of a trespass! The question has been
raised in a few recent cases' whether such a subsurface trespass is
actionable, and, if so, whether the proper remedy is legal or equitable.
This Comment will discuss, in turn, the development of the con-
cept of subsurface trespass, the effect of state regulation on the in-
junctive remedy, the remedy of damages, and the judicial climate
regarding trespass in secondary recovery in the oil producing states
whose courts have spoken on the subject.
I. TRE-SPASS IN OIL AND GAS LAW
The tort of trespass has been applied many times to cases of in-
vasion of subsurface minerals.! Since the earliest cases, the courts
'See generally Legal Problems of Water Flooding, Recycling and Other Secondary
Operations, 9th Ann. Inst. on Oil & Gas and Taxation 105 (1958).2 1d. at 106, 128.
' One of the most prevalent water flooding patterns is the "five spot," in which four
input wells are situated in the four corners of an imaginary square and a producing
well is located within the square.
487 C.J.S. Trespass S 111 (1954).
' The rule of capture has been stated as follows: "The owner of a tract of land acquires
title to the oil and gas which he produces from wells drilled thereon, though it may be
proved that part of such oil or gas migrated from adjoining lands." Hardwicke, The Rule
of Capture and Its Implications as Applied to Oil and Gas, 13 Texas L. Rev. 391, 403
(1935).
5 2 Am. Jur. Trespass 5§ 14, 18 (1962). But cf. Railroad Comm'n v. Manziel, -
Tex.- , 361 S.W.2d 560 (1962).
7 See notes 36, 37, 44 infra and accompanying text.
'See Jones, Tort Liabilities in Secondary Recovery Operations, 6th Ann. Rocky Mt.
Mineral Law Inst. 639 (1961) and cases cited therein.
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have uniformly recognized that one who, without privilege, enters
another's land and takes oil and gas therefrom is liable as a tres-
passer.9 The trespass was said to be committed not only against the
surface estate but also against the minerals."0 These holdings set the
stage for later cases which held that no actual surface trespass is
necessary and that subsurface trespass is a separate and distinct tort."
Trespass has thus been found in the case of slant wells bottomed
under another's land, 2 sandfracing," and salt water injection. "
In each of these instances, the trespass was committed in its entirety
beneath the surface."
Only a handful of cases have arisen in which it was claimed that
injected water crossing lease lines constituted trespass. This may be
due in part to the relative newness of secondary recovery in the oil
industry" and the seeming disinclination of oilmen to litigate their
rights against other oilmen, 7 but part of it must be ascribed to the
failure of attorneys to raise the issue." Only three courts have en-
tertained an action for damages based on trespass in secondary re-
covery, and two of these cases resulted in money judgments for
plaintiffs." In the third, the court held that there was no injury and
thus did not reach the question of trespass." In addition, no court
has ever permanently enjoined a secondary recovery operation on
grounds of trespass."
9 1 Summers, Oil & Gas Law § 21 (2d ed. 1954).
10 ibid.
" In cases in which severed mineral interests were involved and the trespasser had permis-
sion of the surface owner to come on the land and drill, no trespass was found except that
committed against the minerals themselves. Ibid.
"Hastings Oil Co. v. Texas Co., 149 Tex. 416, 234 S.W.2d 389 (1950); Alphonzo
E. Bell Corp. v. Bell View Oil Syndicate, 21 Cal. App. 2d 587, 76 P.2d 167 (Ct. App.
1938); Note, 16 Texas L. Rev. 543 (1938). But cf. Humble Oil & Ref. Co. v. L. & G.
Oil Co., 259 S.W.2d 933 (Tex. Civ. App. 1953). See also 1 Summers, op. cit. supra note 9, at
S 26 (2d ed. 1954).
'aDelhi-Taylor Corp. v. Holmes, 162 Tex. 39, 344 S.W.2d 420 (1961); Gregg v.
Delhi-Taylor Corp. 162 Tex. 26, 344 S.W.2d 411 (1961).
4 West Edmund Hunton Lime Unit v. Lillard, 265 P.2d 730 (Okla. 1954).
"See Keeton & Jones, Tort Liability and the Oil and Gas Industry, 35 Texas L. Rev. 1
(1956); Smith, Rights and Liabilities on Subsurface Operations, 8th Ann. Inst. on Oil &
Gas and Taxation 1 (1957).
" Although the theory of secondary recovery dates back to 1907, the earliest instance
of water flooding on a large scale was in the Midway Field in Arkansas; the project began
in 1943. Brown & Myers, Some Legal Aspects of Water Flooding, 24 Texas L. Rev. 456,
457 (1946).
' For an example, see Hughes, op. cit. supra note 1, at 137-3 8.
"In Railroad Comm'n v. Manziel, - Tex. -, 361 S.W.2d 560 (1962), the theory
of trespass was not brought up until it was suggested from the bench during oral argument
before the Supreme Court of Texas. Appellant's Answer to Appellees Brief, p. 2.
"9See notes 43, 44 infra and accompanying text.
' See note 42 infra and accompanying text.
" Injunction did issue on the applied theory of subsurface trespass in the case of slant
wells and sandfracing. See notes 12, 13 supra.
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A. Injunctions And State Regulation Of Secondary Recovery
Courts of equity normally restrain a trespass if it appears that
irreparable injury might result therefrom, and it has been said that
courts have greater than usual latitude in restraining trespass to
minerals because the trespass goes immediately to the destruction of
the minerals themselves.2 However, in litigation based on water flood-
ing, an overriding factor of public interest is present. In the great
majority of the oil and gas producing states, secondary recovery
plans must gain the approval of a state regulatory agency;" thus,
the plaintiff in such litigation usually must ask the court to enjoin
what the administrative body expressly permits.
The power of the state to control the oil and gas industry in
order to prevent waste has been affirmed on many occasions. 4 Be-
cause secondary recovery is an important conservation means,"
regulatory agencies in most of the oil producing states exercise some
degree of control over it." These agencies maintain that supervision
is necessary to prevent wasteful duplication of effort and to insure
that maximum efficient recovery is obtained. 7 Thus, today, an opera-
tor must submit a water flooding plan to the regulatory agency and
often participate in lengthy hearings, after which the agency may
(1) allow the producer to proceed with the plan, (2) deny per-
mission, or (3) amend the plan to suit its requirements." If an
adjacent landowner is given the opportunity to oppose such an appli-
cation before the agency, he has been afforded an administrative
remedy which he must exhaust as a prerequisite to court action.2"
Assuming exhaustion of the administrative remedy, the question is
whether administrative authorization casts a "cloak of protection""0
around the injecting party and denies the adjacent owner a remedy.
In Corzelius v. Railroad Comm'n,' a Texas court refused to enjoin
an authorized subsurface invasion. Corzelius was ordered by the
22High, Injunctions § 730 (4th ed. 1905), cited in Hastings Oil Co. v. Texas Co.,
149 Tex. 416, 234 S.W.2d 389 (1950).
23 Sullivan, Conservation of Oil and Gas, A.B.A. Section of Mineral Law (1958).
24See, e.g., Walls v. Midland Carbon Co., 254 U.S. 300 (1920) (upholding a state
statute prohibiting manufacture of carbon black from certain grades of natural gas).
2 McElroy, Water Flooding of Oil Reservoirs, 7 Baylor L. Rev. 18 (1955).
25 Sullivan, op. cit. supra note 23.
27 Ibid.
2 A study of the cases involving secondary recovery plans would seem to indicate that
permission is seldom, if ever, denied.
2 See, e.g., Jackson v. State Corp. Comm'n, 186 Kan. 6, 348 P.2d 613 (1960); Railroad
Comm'n v. Manziel, __ Tex. -, 361 S.W.2d 560 (1962).
a'Railroad Comm'n v. Manziel, supra note 29; Gregg v. Delhi-Taylor Corp., 162 Tex.
26, 344 S.W.2d 411 (1961); Corzelius v. Railroad Comm'n, 182 S.W.2d 412 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1944).
s Corzelius v. Railroad Comm'n, supra note 30.
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Texas Railroad Commission to kill a well located on his lease that
had developed a gas leak in the casing, cratered, and caught fire.
Corzelius could not afford to drill the necessary directional well, so
the Commission authorized Harrel, the adjoining leaseholder, as its
agent," to drill a directional well to be bottomed under Corzelius'
land; the court rejected Corzelius' contention that such action would
constitute a trespass. Although this case should be cited as authority
only for the proposition that in periods of emergency the police power
of the state can be invoked to accomplish almost any needed result,
the court used the following language, which has been quoted in
support of the "cloak of protection" theory: "[B]eing authorized by
law such entry did not constitute a trespass.""
No court has ever permanently enjoined a water flooding opera-
tion. Recent cases in Illinois"4 and North Dakota"5 refused injunctive
relief to dissenting royalty and mineral owners in fields unitized for
secondary recovery. Both states' courts mentioned, in dictum, that
public policy favors secondary recovery projects, but the issue of
trespass was not raised in either of the cases. Then came the im-
portant cases of Manziel v. Railroad Comn'n 8 and Jackson v. State
Corp. Comm'n, ' both of which squarely presented the issue of
trespass. In both, petitioners sought injunctions" to prevent adjacent
lease operators from pursuing water flooding plans on grounds that
injection would result in trespass and cause petitioners damage, and
in both cases, respondents set up the defense that the appropriate
state regulatory agency had approved the plans. The courts applied
the substantial evidence test, found that substantial evidence support-
ed the agency findings, and denied the petitions. In the Manziel case,
the Supreme Court of Texas said:
Certainly, it is relevant to consider and weigh the interests of society
and the oil and gas industry as a whole against the interests of the
individual operator who is damaged; and if the authorized activities
in an adjoining secondary recovery unit are found to be based on some
substantial, justifiable occasion, then this court should sustain their
validity."
The court stated that it did not reach the "cloak of protection"
"' 182 S.W.2d at 413.
"Id. at 417.
'" Reed v. Texas Co., 22 Ill. App. 2d 131, 159 N.E.2d 641 (1959).
"Syverson v. North Dakota State Indus. Comm'n, - N.D. -, 111 N.W.2d 122
(1961).
88 Railroad Comm'n v. Manziel, - Tex. -, 361 S.W.2d 560 (1962).
" Jackson v. State Corp. Comm'n, 186 Kan. 6, 348 P.2d 613 (1960).
"Actually, petitioners in the Jackson case sought a cease and desist order.
8 361 S.W.2d at 568.
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question, but merely applied the substantial evidence test."
Whether the various state courts say that an act authorized by
law is per se not a trespass41 or that it may be a technical trespass
but not enjoinable because of public policy, it is submitted that the
Manziel and Jackson cases were decided correctly, for injunction is
not the proper remedy for the adjoining owner who has been or is
about to be injured by encroaching secondary recovery forces. Bar-
ring attacks based on the alleged unconstitutionality of enabling
legislation, violation of procedural due process, or lack of substantial
evidence, the courts have no jurisdiction in the regulation of second-
ary recovery operations. The states have created expert adminis-
trative agencies and vested them with statutory responsibility for
such regulation. However, it is the province of the courts to protect
the rights of those injured by their neighbor's secondary recovery
project by providing them an action at law for damages.
B. Legal Remedy
Two cases have come before the Supreme Court of Oklahoma in
which damages were claimed for the subsurface encroachment of
salt water. In West Edmund Salt Water Disposal Ass'n v. Rosecrans,"
the court held that no action for trespass would lie where the plaintiff
failed to prove actual damages, but the court reserved the question
of whether actionable trespass had occurred. This was answered in
the affirmative in West Edmund Hunton Lime Unit v. Lillard."'
Here, plaintiff's producing oil well was flooded out by defendant's
injected salt water, and plaintiff brought an action claiming the
value of oil well casing lost on account of salt water flooding the hole
and extraordinary expenses incurred in attempting to retrieve the
casing and in shutting down the well. Defendants claimed they
should be liable only for the cost of plugging the well, but the
court affirmed judgment for plaintiff for all the amounts claimed.
In 1960, the United States District Court for the District of
Kansas entertained the third and, to date, latest secondary recovery
trespass suit-the first such suit to claim damages for loss of oil
and exemplary damages. In Tidewater Oil Co. v. Jackson," the same
plaintiffs who failed in their petition to enjoin Tidewater's approved
water flooding plan in the Kansas courts brought suit in federal
court and were awarded 620,700 dollars actual damages and 25,000
'Old. at 566.
"'This is another way of stating the "cloak of protection" theory.
2204 Okla. 9, 226 P.2d 965 (1950).
"3265 P.2d 730 (Okla. 1954).
"320 F.2d 157 (10th Cir. 1963).
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dollars exemplary damages.' Tidewater appealed, and, in a decision
handed down by the Tenth Circuit in 1963, the higher court unani-
mously affirmed the trial court's decision as to actual damages, re-
versing the award of punitive damages."0 While noting that the
issue of tort liability in secondary recovery had not arisen in the
Kansas courts, the Tenth Circuit briefly considered the possible legal
bases of recovery. "The question then is by what standards of tort
liability shall Tidewater's conduct be judged, i.e., trespass, nuisance,
negligence, strict liability, or unreasonable use or disregard of an-
other's property." '47 After discussing the paucity of black letter law
in this field in other jurisdictions as well as Kansas, the court identi-
fied the legal basis as the "intentional and unreasonable interference
with the claimants' property rights, resulting in actual and sub-
stantial damages." Thus the Tenth Circuit seems to have followed
the trial court" in basing recovery on the doctrine of "reasonable
, ,49use.
The doctrine of "reasonable use"" ° developed out of dissatisfaction
4' The important facts in the case are as follows: Tidewater, lessee of a major portion of
the huge Blankenship-Sallyards Reservoir in Kansas, began authorized water flooding
operations in a portion of its leasehold in 1948. In 1953, Tidewater applied for and was
granted permission to repressure and water flood the Bartlesville formation through wells
on eleven sections of land. In 1954, Jackson Brothers acquired a lease bordering on the
eleven sections and by July, 1956, had drilled nine wells into the Bartlesville formation,
each well being approximately fifty feet from the common lease line. Meanwhile, Tide-
water's water flooding operation proceeded with input wells being drilled nearer and
nearer to the Jackson Brothers lease. In 1956, Tidewater proposed to the Jacksons that the
two co-operate in a water flooding plan. Jackson Brothers declined, saying they were still
obtaining primary production from their lease, that they could not then afford to participate
in the plan, and that they desired to continue with primary production for two years
before initiating a water flooding program. During these negotiations, Tidewater indicated
an interest in purchasing Jackson Brothers' lease and obtained copies of electric logs on
all of the Jacksons' wells. Later Tidewater notified the Jacksons that it would not make
an offer.
Following the negotiations, Tidewater drilled three input wells as near as possible to
the common lease line and directly across the line from three of the Jacksons' producers.
One of the Jackson Brothers wells was flooded out within a few hours of the commence-
ment of injection, and within a few weeks, two more producing wells were flooded. At
the time injection in the three wells in question was commenced, Tidewater had no
producing wells drilled for purpose of recovery; the purpose of the three injection wells
was allegedly to create a water block along the lease boundary. Tidewater Oil Co. v.
Jackson, 320 F.2d 157 (10th Cir. 1963). For the findings of fact and conclusions of law
in the trial court, see 17 Oil & Gas Rep. 282 (1963).
"Ibid. One judge dissented in part on the ground that punitive damages should have
been allowed.47 Id. at 162.
48See Brief for Appellant, p. 57; Brief for Appellee, pp. 24-25, Tidewater Oil Co. v.
Jackson, 320 F.2d 157 (10th Cir. 1963).
41 Mason v. Hoyle, 56 Conn. 255, 14 Atl. 786 (1888) (owner of mill privilege un-
reasonably injuring downstream mill owners); Rancho Santa Margarita v. Vail, 11 Cal. 2d
501, 81 P.2d 533 (1938) (diversion of stream where upper riparian owner had other
reasonably economical water sources); Kasuba v. Graves, 109 Vt. 191, 194 Atl. 455 (1937)
(pumping additional water into a stream, flooding lower riparian lands).
5' Also called the "American Rule" and the "Rule of Correlative Rights." See Annot.,
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with the English common-law rule with respect to percolating
water;' the American courts prefer a rule of "correlative rights""
to one of absolute ownership. If oil may properly be analogized to
percolating water, the Jackson case squarely presented the issue of
reasonableness. On the side of the injecting party, it may be argued
that the only means of preventing migration from lease to lease is
to form a water barrier along the lease line by placing injection wells
on the lease boundary. 4 Although injected water may cross the
lease boundary, in theory at least, the adjoining owner is benefited
by increased pressure in his reservoir and by the fact that the input
well may drive some of the injecting party's oil across the boundary."
On the side of the adjoining owner, it may be argued that offset
wells, rather than a water block, are the proper means of protecting
correlative rights. Furthermore, even if the water block is a reason-
able means of protecting rights, the injecting party owes a duty to
his neighbor to so locate his input wells as to cause a minimum of
damage.
The parent of the "reasonable use" doctrine is the tort of nuis-
ance.' In cases of underground water pollution, actionability is
generally based on either negligence or nuisance." Nuisance is, of
course, limited by the doctrine of "reasonable use," i.e., defendant is
55 A.L.R. 1385, 1398 (1928). The doctrine of "reasonable use" developed as a defense
to the tort of nuisance, but the trend appears to be toward utilizing it as an independent
cause of action. As applied to percolating waters, the rule limits the right of the landowner
to whatever amount of such waters under his lands that is necessary for him to divert
in order to make reasonable use of the land.
"I Under English law, percolating waters were, for a time, regarded as belonging to
the landowner, who could, in the absence of malice, appropriate to his own use such waters
as were on his premises. Acton v. Blundell, 12 M. & W. 324, 152 Eng. Rep. 140 (1843).
"2Swett v. Cutts, 50 N.H. 439 (1870); Bassett v. Salisbury Mfg. Co., 43 N.H. 569
(1862).
'" Midway Irrigation Co. v. Snake Creek Mineral & Tunnel Co., 271 Fed. 157 (8th
Cir. 1921), affirmed, 260 U.S. 596 (1922).
[W]hile the owner of land is entitled to appropriate subterranean or other
waters accumulating on his land, which thereby become a part of the realty,
he cannot extract and appropriate them in excess of a reasonable and bene-
ficial use upon the land he owns, unconnected with the beneficial use of the
land, especially if the exercise of such use in excess of the reasonable and
beneficial use is injurious to others, who have substantial rights to the water.
271 Fed. at 162-63.
"4 The Kansas Corporation Commission so found in hearings in the Jackson case.
"Western Gulf Oil Co. v. Superior Oil Co., 92 Cal. App. 2d 299, 206 P.2d 944
(Ct. App. 1949).
"Contrary to the finding of the Corporation Commission, the court found that there
was no established custom or practice in the oil industry of injecting water barriers along
lease lines to prevent migration. Finding of Fact XXXVIII, 17 Oil & Gas Rep. 282, 295
(1963).
", See note 45 supra.
"United Fuel Gas Co. v. Sawyers, 259 S.W.2d 466 (Ky. 1953).
"'Martin v. Shell Petroleum Corp., 133 Kan. 124, 299 Pac. 261 (1931); Texas Co. v.
Giddings, 148 S.W. 1142 (Tex. Civ. App. 1912).
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not guilty of creating a nuisance if the use to which he put his land
was reasonable."' Two recent Oklahoma cases found the existence
of nuisance in secondary recovery projects."'
Williams and Meyers suggest a different approach to the problem:
What may be called a 'negative rule of capture' appears to be develop-
ing. Just as under the rule of capture a landowner may capture such
oil or gas as will migrate from adjoining premises to a well bottomed
on his own land, so also may he inject into a formation substances
which may migrate through the structure to the land of others, even
if this results in the displacement under such land of more valuable
with less valuable substances (e.g., the displacement of wet gas by
dry gas)."
Under this theory, the Jacksons' remedy would be a water flooding
program of their own, and a small tact owner, for whom a second-
ary recovery project is not economically feasible, would have no
remedy. But Williams and Meyers do not propose that the injecting
party has an absolute right to inject without liability.
The law on this subject has not as yet been fully developed, but it
seems reasonable to suggest the qualification that such activity will
be permitted, free of any claim for damages, only if pursued as part
of a reasonable program of development and without injury to pro-
ducing or potentially producing formations."
Basing their discussion on the Lillard case"4 and Tidewater Associated
Oil Co. v. Stott," Williams and Meyers point out that apparently the
theory of ownership of oil and gas has nothing to do with subsurface
trespass actions. They note that Lillard, decided in a qualified own-
ership state, allowed the injured landowner to recover for his loss
while Stott, decided under Texas ownership in place law, denied re-
covery. They conclude that contemporary authority" is against im-
position of liability for migration of injected water on any theory of
trespass, apart from special damages such as were recovered in
Lillard. However, they suggest that injury to producing or potential-
ly producing formations should be actionable.67
Williams and Meyers do not provide any concrete suggestion as
65 See Annot., 38 A.L.R.2d 1265, 1268 (1954).
65 See notes 86, 87 infra and accompanying text.
41 Williams & Meyers, Oil & Gas Law § 204.5 (1962).
63 Ibid.
64 See note 43 supra and accompanying text.
65 159 F.2d 174 (sth Cir. 1946), cert. denied, 351 U.S. 817 (1947) (Lessee held not
liable under Texas law where dry gas he injected under neighbor's land displaced wet gas
under lessor's land. Here lessor had declined an opportunity to unitize.)
6 It should be noted that Williams and Meyers wrote before the Manziel, Jackson, and
Delhi-Taylor cases.
67 1 Williams & Meyers, op. cit. supra note 62.
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to what law is to be applied to an action for injury to formations,
and they do not discuss the problem of an action for damages for
loss of oil beyond the statement that contemporary authority does
not support such actionability. Certainly, the broad language of the
"reasonable use" doctrine may be extended to include water flooding
situations,as and the tort of nuisance could also be applied; however,
there is no logical reason why the law of trespass should not apply.
In secondary recovery cases, there is actual physical invasion which
is the proximate cause of the injury. However, the seeming reluc-
tance on the part of some courts to call an authorized water flooding
project a "trespass" has apparently induced attorneys to base actions
at law on other legal grounds. Nevertheless, the fact remains that,
no matter what it is called, the physical invasion of property forms
the basis of the cause of action.
There is no real reason to rely on the vague analogy of "reasonable
use." Even in nonownership theory states,0" trespass could be applied
in situations similar to the Jackson case on the ground that defendant's
waters trespassing underneath plaintiff's land have caused injury."
The same result would occur as if a trespasser entered the surface of
the land and destroyed the productivity of the well. 1 There is no
necessity that the plaintiff prove ownership of the minerals in place,
but only that his right to reduce them to possession, under the rule
of capture, has been thwarted by reason of the alleged trespass.
Finally, regardless of the theory adopted and regardless of whether
or not a water flooding program has been approved by the state, if
an oil operator effectuates such a program and in doing so injures his
neighbor, the injecting operator should make reparations. The rule
of capture and the protection of correlative rights demand that the
operator of a flooded-out well be indemnified for his loss. Otherwise,
a small tract owner might find his entire tract swept clean of oil
within a matter of days, and he would be without a remedy. Further-
more, a serious due process question is presented if the state attempts
to immunize an individual who has done damage to another. Precise
location of the limit on the power of the state to permit invasion
68 The doctrine applies primarily to extraction of water from the ground. See notes
49, 51, 52, 53 supra.
"'Williams and Meyers classify the following as nonownership states: California,
Illinois, Kentucky, Louisiana, and New York. 1 Williams & Meyers, op. cit. supra note 62,
at § 203.
"0Nonownership states, as well as the other states, call it a trespass when oil is
wrongfully produced by slant wells. See 1 Summers, op. cit. supra note 9, at § 26.
" An action for damages lies if a lessee unnecessarily damages the production of a well
on lessor's land, so as to cause drainage of oil to other leases. Morriss v. Barton, 200 Okla.
4, 190 P.2d 451 (1947).
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without compensation is beyond the scope of this Comment, but
the problem may be circumvented if the state provides a remedy in
damages.
C. Measure Of Damages
The appropriate measure of damages in a continuing trespass to oil
and gas property is the decrease in market value"2 of the property
invaded, measured first before the trespass occurred and second from
past losses and projected future losses calculated at the trial." In
Jackson v. Tidewater Oil Co.,"4 the trial court seems to have arrived
at its finding on actual damages according to this formula. In addi-
tion, the court allowed plaintiffs to recover actual capital expendi-
tures on account of the invasion, which included the cost of drilling
new wells to replace those which were flooded out."5
It is not clear from the opinion in the Jackson case precisely how
damages were computed."0 It is submitted that damages in such cases
should be rationalized as follows: Before the trespassing waters were
injected into the ground," there existed X barrels" of oil which were
ultimately recoverable' and which the property owners had the right,
subject to production allowable restriction," to capture. At the time
72 McDaniel Bros. v. Wilson, 70 S.W.2d 618 (Tex. Civ. App. 1934) error ref. If
market value cannot be proved, actual value is the proper measure. Steger v. Barrett,
124 S.W. 174 (Tex. Civ. App. 1910) error ref. See 87 C.J.S. Trespass § 117 (1954).
"See Whitson Co. v. Bluff Creek Oil Co., 293 S.W.2d 488 (Tex. Civ. App. 1956).
,4 See note 44 supra.
, Brief for Appellant, pp. 62-66; Brief for Appellee, pp. 53-65, Tidewater Oil Co. v.
Jackson, 320 F.2d 157 (10th Cir. 1963).
70 The measure of damages to real property is not invariable, the amount to be awarded
being such sum as will compensate the injured owner for the detriment proximately caused
thereby. 25 C.J.S. Dansages § 84 (1954). In the Jackson case, the Tenth Circuit adopted
the trial court's method of computation.
The Court explained that this loss was the result of increased lifting costs, due
to the necessity of disposing of excessive quantities of water injected by
Tidewater; the loss of fuel for the pumping wells, due to the loss of natural
gas as a result of the flooding operations; the acceleration of the time when
the economic limit of production from the wells on the Barrier tract would
be lost; the destruction and loss of producing wells on the Barrier property;
and the loss of substantial quantities of recoverable oil under the Barrier lease,
as a result of being bypassed or 'watered off' by the excessive injection of
salt water by Tidewater. 320 F.2d at 164.
Tidewater did not seriously question the means used in arrived at the amount of damages.
"By setting the time here instead of just before the water crosses the line, defendant
is given an offset for benefits conferred in causing oil to migrate across the boundary.
7' The unknowns, X and Y, should be calculated in terms of discounted value of the
oil in the reservoir according to contemporaneous production allowables. In situations in
which migration is capable of calculation, that factor should also be considered.
" Assuming Jackson had used the best available recovery methods.
" Production allowable plays a part here because the amount capable of production
depends, in part, on the rate of production. Generally, in a low pressure field, the faster
the injection and production of "dead oil," the more oil will be recovered ultimately. See
Whorton & Kieschnick, A Preliminary Report on Oil Recovery by High Pressure Gas
Injection, Am, Petroleum Inst, (1950). A logical solution would be to assume, for purposes
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of the trial, there are Y barrels of oil ultimately recoverable; this
sum should include that oil produced in the interim between the
trespass and the trial. If X exceeds Y, then plaintiff has suffered
damage, and he should recover the value" of the lost oil. He should
also be allowed recovery for cost of drilling new wells if any are
needed to give him the well capacity with which to produce his oil."2
In other words, wells needed to replace those flooded out by defend-
ant's injection program should be replaced at defendant's expense,
together with all other uncompensated necessary expenditures proxi-
mately caused by the water flooding. If Y equals or exceeds X plus
any necessary well costs, there should be no recovery at all. In other
words, if plaintiff has suffered no monetary loss, even after the loss
of needed well capacity by flooding out has been taken into con-
sideration, the trespass is damnum absque injuria.
II. REVIEW OF THE DECISIONS AND CONCLUSIONS
Development of the law of trespass in secondary recovery is just
beginning. The Jackson case is the only case in which recovery for
loss of oil has been asked, and it, of course, lacks the force of stare
decisis in Kansas state courts." Thus, it is not possible to predict
with accuracy how a particular jurisdiction is likely to deal with
the problem; however, a brief review of dicta in jurisdictions that
have spoken on the subject sheds a modicum of light.
A. Oklahoma
In view of the holdings in the Rosecrans" and Lillard"s cases, it
logically may be inferred that the Oklahoma Supreme Court accepts
the doctrine of trespass committed by water flooding and will allow
recovery of any special damages proximately caused. In Lillard, the
of calculation of ultimately recoverable oil, that future allowables will be set according
to state regulatory agency policy in effect at the time of the trial.
s Market value at the time of the trespass. 87 C.J.S. Trespass § 117 (1954).
s2 Plaintiff should recover only for the cost of wells actually needed to restore productive
capacity, which probably will not equal the number of wells flooded out.
" There are indications that the Kansas Supreme Court might have decided the damage
suit differently from the Federal Court holding. The trial court's finding with respect to
oil industry water blocking practices, i.e., that there is no such established custom, conflicts
with the finding of the Kansas Corporation Commission, and the latter finding was tacitly
accepted by the Kansas Supreme Court. Brief for Appellant, pp. 40, 41, Tidewater Oil
Co. v. Jackson, 320 F.2d 157 (10th Cir. 1963). The court also found that Tidewater
was acting outside its authorization in drilling input wells flush against the lease line
and directly across from three of Jackson Brothers' producing wells, whereas the Kansas
Supreme Court indicated otherwise. Conclusions of Law V; 348 P.2d at 615.
'4 West Edmund Hunton Salt Water Disposal Unit v. Rosecrans, 204 Okla. 9, 226
P.2d 965 (1950).
8' West Edmund Hunton Lime Unit v. Lillard, 265 P.2d 730 (Okla. 1954).
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plaintiff did not claim damages for loss of oil production, and the
question of whether loss of oil is recoverable in a trespass action re-
mains unanswered. It is interesting to note that Oklahoma has also
allowed recovery in cases involving secondary recovery on the theory
of private nuisance. In Lyons v. McKay," the court held that drilling
operations may become a private nuisance if injury is proximately
caused, and in Gulf Oil Corp. v. Hughes,7 the court found a private
nuisance where encroaching secondary recovery waters polluted
plaintiff's water well.
B. Texas
Dicta in Texas cases is very much in conflict as regards acceptance
of the theory of underground trespass. In Eliff v. Texan Drilling
Co.," the Texas Supreme Court said: "Each owner of land owns sep-
arately, distinctly and exclusively all the oil and gas under his land
and is accorded the usual remedies against trespassers who appropriate
the minerals or destroy their market value.""9 In Hastings Oil Co. v.
Texas Co.," the court held that a continuous physical invasion of an
adjoining mineral estate by drilling across lease lines is a trespass.
Then, in the much discussed companion cases of Delhi-Taylor Oil
Corp. v. Holmes" and Gregg v. Delhi-Taylor Oil Corp.," the court
enjoined a sandfracing operation in which it was shown that the sand-
fracing would open fissures which would cross lease lines. In the
Gregg case, the court found that it had jurisdiction to determine
whether a trespass had occurred or was about to occur on the ground
that the tort of trespass presents questions which are primarily judicial
in nature and the court was not bound to a review of a Railroad Com-
mission determination under the substantial evidence rule."' Then,
after holding that injunction would issue to prevent the threatened
sandfracing operation, the majority stated that they did not reach
the question whether the operation would be a trespass if carried
through."4
In the Manziel case," there is rather strong dicta against application
of trespass law to secondary recovery. Although the holding in the
s313 P.2d 527 (Okla. 1957).
17 371 P.2d 81 (Okla. 1962).
88 146 Tex. 575, 210 S.W.2d 558 (1948).
81d. at 561.
88149 Tex. 416, 234 S.W.2d 389 (1950).
9'162 Tex. 39, 344 S.W.2d 420 (1961).
92162 Tex. 26, 344 S.W.2d 411 (1961).
"3344 S.W.2d at 415. Note that there was no administrative action in the Gregg case
prior to the petition for injunction.
94 Id. at 417.
"' Railroad Comm'n v. Manziel, __ Tex. -, 361 S.W.2d 560 (1962).
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Manziel case is limited to a denial of injunction, the court went
on to say:
We conclude that if, in the valid exercise of its authority to prevent
waste, protect correlative rights, or in the exercise of other powers
within its jurisdiction, the Commission authorizes secondary recovery
projects, a trespass does not occur when the injected, secondary re-
covery forces move across lease lines, and the operations are not
subject to an injunction on that basis. The technical rules of trespass
have no place in the consideration of the validity of the orders of the
Commission."
But in spite of this language, the question remains whether the
technical rules of trespass" have a place in the consideration of a
damage suit."
Amicus curiae briefs representing interests in the East Texas Oil
Field were filed in the Manziel case after the issue of trespass was
raised in the case, pointing out that if the petitioners' theory of
trespass were accepted, the injection of salt water in the East Texas
Field would have already caused subsurface trespass of the greatest
magnitude." However, by setting the time of the initial trespass
within the limit of the Texas two-year statute of limitations, dam-
ages would be largely obviated. Furthermore, by computation of dam-
ages according to the formula set out supra, the result of any damage
suit arising out of the East Texas Field would not be unfair, in view
of the fact that calculation of damages must depend on actual loss.
Nevertheless, a plaintiff suing for damages in Texas would prob-
ably have a stronger case if he could allege a "reasonable use" situa-
tion, 0° i.e., that defendant's water flooding operation was conducted
l Id. at 568.
'The court provides a clue that "trespass," for purposes of the opinion in the
Manziel case, means only "trespass for injunction purposes" with the following language:
The subsurface invasion of adjoining mineral estates by injected salt water
of a secondary recovery project is to be expected, and in the case at bar
we are not confronted with the tort aspects of such practcies . . . rather
we are faced with an issue of whether a trespass is committed when secondary
recovery waters from an authorized secondary recovery project cross lease
lines. 361 S.W.2d at 566-67. (Emphasis added.)
8At least one writer believes that an action for damages in this area must be based
on negligence or unreasonableness. McElroy, supra note 25. In Commanche Duke Oil Co. v.
Texas Pac. Coal & Oil Co., 298 S.W. 554 (Tex. Comm. App. 1927), in which defendant
shot a well with nitroglycerine and caused plaintiff's well on an adjoining tract to be
flooded with water, defendant was liable on the theory of negligence. Also, two later
cases held that permitting salt water and other waste products to escape or flow on another's
property is not actionable without proof of negligence. Turner v. Big Lake Oil Co., 128
Tex. 155, 96 S.W.2d 221 (1936); Cosden Oil Co. v. Sides, 35 S.W.2d 815 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1931).
"Railroad Comm'n v. Manziel,_ Tex. -, 361 S.W.2d 560, 568 (1962).
'Jackson Brothers relied on the "reasonable use" doctrine, quoting the following
language from City of Muskogee v. Hancock, 58 Okla. 1, 158 Pac. 622 (1916):
The general rule that no one has absolute freedom in the use of his property,
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in an unreasonable manner. In the Delhi-Taylor cases,"' the evidence
showed that if the defendant had been allowed to proceed with the
sandfracing, defendant's well would have produced far in excess
of the amount of oil then in place under the land,1"' and this may
have been the .controlling factor in the decision. Furthermore, other
Texas cases show a trend on the part of the courts toward the "fair
share" doctrine, that is, a mineral owner should have the opportunity
to produce his fair share of the oil in the reservoir."' Although a
secondary recovery project is not enjoinable on this theory, 4 the
right of the flooded out operator to produce his fair share might form
the basis of recovery of damages in Texas.
C. Illinois
In the often quoted case of Reed v. Texas Co.,'0 ' the Illinois Su-
preme Court held that dissenting mineral owners in a unitized field
could not block secondary recovery (by injunction) on the ground
that oil to which the dissenters had title would be pushed from
underneath their land. The case is distinguishable from the Jackson
situation in that (1) trespass was not alleged and (2) the court
found as fact that no loss of oil would be suffered by plaintiffs as a
result of the secondary project. The court spoke in terms of the
"compensating counterdrainage" theory... enunciated in Carter Oil
Co. v. Dees,'°7 and it should be pointed out that the Illinois court
has yet to be confronted with a case not involving compensating
counterdrainage. Nevertheless, the court reflected the trend away
from enjoining water flooding because public policy so strongly
favors it.
D. North Dakota
Although North Dakota joined the ranks of oil producing states
but is restrained by the coexistence of equal rights in his neighbor to the use
of his property, so that each in exercising his right must do no act which
causes injury to his neighbor, is so well understood, is so universally recognized,
and stands so impregnable in the necessities of the social state, that its
vindication by argument would be superfluous. Ibid.
101 See note 13 supra.
"' Gregg v. Delhi-Taylor Corp., 162 Tex. 26, 344 S.W.2d 411, 414 (1961).
'
05Cf. Halbouty v. Railroad Comm'n, __ Tex. -, 357 S.W.2d 364 (1962), noted
in 17 Sw. L.J. 674 (1963); Atlantic Ref. Co. v. Railroad Comm'n, 162 Tex. 274, 346
S.W.2d 801 (1961).
'04 Railroad Comm'n v. Manziel, - Tex. -, 361 S.W.2d 560 (1962).
'0522 Ill. App. 131, 159 N.E.2d 641 (1959).
" We conceive the law to be that an operator must be reasonably diligent to
prevent waste, and to prevent any substantial loss of oil, but that the absolute
prevention of any movement of oil underground across a boundary line is not
humanly possible. If the oil moving off one lease is compensated by a sub-
stantially equal amount from the same pool, there is no actual loss. Id.
at 644-45.
107Carter Oil Co. v. Dees, 340 II1. App. 449, 92 N.E.2d 519 (1950).
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only recently,"8 the North Dakota Supreme Court has had occasion
to comment on secondary recovery. In Syverson v. North Dakota
State Industrial Comm'n, °' the court followed Illinois in denying
injunction to dissenting royalty and mineral owners seeking to block
secondary recovery. Recognizing the problem of a damage suit, the
court said: "Whatever the result would be if the appellants could
show actual damages, they certainly are not entitled to complain in
the absence of such showing.""... Beyond this, there is no indication
how the court might view a damage suit. It may be inferred that
the North Dakota court will not enjoin a secondary recovery project
in view of a favoring statutory policy,"' even if a petitioner could
show damages.
E. California
California, which holds that an underground trespass occurs in
slant well cases," has anticipated actions for damages arising from
secondary recovery situations. A recently enacted statute. 3 provides:
Injury to formations bearing oil and gas or to oil or gas wells caused
by the subsurface migration of any substance as a result of secondary
recovery operations for oil or gas conducted in accordance with good
oilfield practices shall not be grounds for enjoining such secondary
recovery operations if adequate security, to be approved by the court,
is given for the payment of any compensable damages to which the
owners of the interests in such formations or wells may be entitled
resulting from such injury. Any benefit to the injured property from
such secondary recovery operation shall be considered in mitigation of
damages for such injury."4
Another California statute"' provides that there is no liability on the
part of the injecting party in a unitized field in the absence of proof
of negligence. So California recognizes the fundamental distinction
between unit situations, as encountered in the Reed and Syverson
cases, and nonunit situations, as in lack-son and Manziel. In the
former, actionability must be based on negligence and causation,
10 Oil was first discovered in North Dakota in 1951.
i09111 N.W.2d 128 (N.D. 1961).
110Id. at 134.
"'.N.D. Cent. Code § 38-08-01 (Supp. 1961).
"' See Alphonzo E. Bell Corp. v. Bell View Oil Syndicate, 21 Cal. App. 2d 587, 76
P.2d 167 (Ct. App. 1938).
" JCalif. Civ. Proc. Code § 731c (Supp. 1961). See 15 Oil & Gas Rep. 252 (1961).
114 Ibid.
"' Calif. Pub. Resources Code § 3320.5 (Supp. 1961).
No working or royalty interest owner shall be liable for any loss or damage
resulting from repressuring or other operations connected with the production
of oil and gas which are conducted, without negligence, pursuant to and in
accordance with a co-operative or unit agreement ordered or approved by
the supervisor pursuant to this act. Ibid.
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and in the latter, indications are strong that the injecting party is
liable if he injures the economic interest of his neighbor; however,
in neither may the injured party get an injunction.
F. Summary
Because good conservation practices demand that secondary re-
covery operations be conducted in some reservoirs, an adjoining
owner in either a unitized or nonunitized field should not be able
to block the project on the ground that a trespass will be committed
or that damage will occur. On the other hand, state authorization
should not immunize an injecting party from paying damages for
torts he may commit within the exercise of the power authorized.
It is submitted that whenever injected waters or other foreign matter
cross lease lines, a trespass has been committed, albeit one which
is condoned by the state, and the trespasser should be liable for actual
damages proximately caused.
Reliance on the strained analogy to perculating waters, as is pres-
ent in the "reasonable use" and "nuisance" doctrines, tends to cloud
the issues when it is utilized in secondary recovery situations. To
allow no remedy in damages whatever in approved water flooding
situations would raise serious due process questions. The law of tres-
pass is well developed in all of the American jurisdictions, and it pro-
vides methods for determining when a wrong has been committed,
who is liable, and the amount of the damages. Trespass is the
appropriate remedy.
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